Europe spent far more on imported oil this spring and got almost nothing extra for it. The value of EU petroleum oil imports jumped 55.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, while the quantity rose by only 1.2 per cent, according to the latest Eurostat energy trade figures.
The gap between those two numbers gives a clear measure of what the current energy shock is costing the bloc.
Same barrels, bigger bill
Average monthly oil imports stood at 36.7 million tonnes, barely changed from the 2025 average. So Europe did not suddenly need much more crude. It paid a great deal more for roughly the same amount.
The pattern holds across the wider energy basket. Eurostat data show the value of EU energy imports up 39.3 per cent on a year earlier, while the total weight rose just 0.4 per cent. The statistics office attributes the increase mainly to higher prices rather than stronger demand.
The effect on trade
That price effect is visible in the EU’s external accounts. The bloc recorded a €21.8 billion goods trade deficit in the second quarter, its first quarterly deficit since 2023. The deficit in energy products alone widened from €71.3 billion in the first quarter to €101.1 billion in the second.
It matters beyond the balance of payments. Crude oil feeds into refinery costs, transport, farming, petrochemicals and manufacturing. A country can see its import bill balloon even when consumption barely changes, and the extra cost tends to spread through the economy.
Refining adds another layer. Diesel margins in Europe have recently reached record highs amid refinery disruption, meaning the cost of turning crude into fuel for trucks, farms and industry has also risen.
A different set of suppliers
What Europe buys has stayed steady, but where it buys has changed dramatically. In the second quarter the United States supplied 18.8 per cent of EU petroleum oil imports. Norway followed with 14.3 per cent and Kazakhstan with 13.4 per cent.
Before 2022, Russia was the EU’s dominant supplier of oil and gas. Sanctions and diversification have moved buying towards North America, Norway and other producers.
The shift is even sharper for liquefied natural gas. The United States provided 63.2 per cent of EU LNG imports in the quarter. Russia was still second on 17.3 per cent, ahead of Algeria on 8.1 per cent.
That Russian share has a deadline. Under rules adopted by EU governments in January, long-term Russian LNG contracts are to be banned from 1 January 2027, with remaining pipeline imports phased out later that year.
Diversifying is not the same as saving money
The figures underline a point that can get lost in the energy security debate. Having more suppliers lowers the strategic risk of relying on one of them. It does not remove exposure to global prices.
Oil is priced on world markets. LNG cargoes can be steered to Europe or Asia depending on price, shipping costs and demand. A disruption elsewhere can push up Europe’s bill even if European consumption stays flat.
The gas numbers show the same effect in a milder form. Compared with the 2025 monthly average, LNG import volumes fell 5.6 per cent in the second quarter while their value rose 4.1 per cent. Pipeline gas went up 3.4 per cent in volume and 18.5 per cent in value. For oil, the price effect was much larger than for either.
What it means
A 1.2 per cent rise in volume alongside a 55.8 per cent rise in value tells its own story. The pressure on Europe’s finances is not about whether it can find enough barrels. It is about how much money leaves the continent to buy them.
Businesses and households are already exposed to those costs as they move through fuel, freight and industrial supply chains. The trade balance has slipped back into deficit.
Europe has largely rebuilt where its oil and gas come from. The second-quarter data show that changing suppliers is not the same as escaping the price of importing energy.
