Lithuania is rebuilding the way it keeps the lights on, and the blueprint is shaped by war. The grid operator Litgrid has announced a plan to build 10 new power plants by 2033, adding 800 megawatts of generating capacity. It is also reorganising the national network so that it can survive attempts to sabotage it.
The aim, Litgrid says, is resilience in an emergency. In practice that means a grid that keeps working even if a key facility is cut off, whether by a cyberattack, a physical strike or a drone.
Seven zones that can stand alone
The central change is structural. Lithuania will form seven electricity zones, each capable of running autonomously when necessary. The model is based on how Ukraine has kept its power system functioning through years of sustained attacks. If one part of the network is knocked out or isolated, the others can continue to supply homes, hospitals and industry.
It is a notable shift in thinking for a modern European grid, which has traditionally been designed for efficiency and cross-border balancing. Resilience against deliberate attack has not usually been the first design principle.
What kind of power plants
Litgrid says it will hold technology-neutral auctions for the new plants next year. It did not say which fuels it expects to be used. The one firm requirement is that the plants must be able to generate electricity when there is no wind and no sun. That points to dispatchable capacity, meaning plants that can be switched on at will, rather than relying only on renewables.
The announcement did not set out costs, locations or financing, and those details will probably emerge as the auction rules take shape.
A decade of tightening security
The plan follows a period in which Baltic states have treated the security of their energy systems as a matter of national defence. In February 2025, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania disconnected from the Russian-controlled electricity system and synchronised with the continental European grid, ending a dependence that dated from the Soviet era.
Since then, officials have turned to the problem of protecting what they have. In September, Reuters reported that Lithuania is designing the planned Gizai substation, about 30 kilometres west of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, to withstand drones carrying around 100 kilograms of explosives. The facility will use reinforced concrete structures and a spread-out layout so that a single hit would damage only a limited amount of equipment. It will also be a hub for Harmony Link, a planned 700-megawatt connection with Poland.
Litgrid’s chief executive, Andrius Semeskevicius, said at the time that grid planners once thought mostly about natural disasters, and now have to consider the whole range of hybrid and conventional threats.
Regional anxiety
The concern is not abstract. A series of sabotage attacks on Germany’s electricity grid this year was blamed by Berlin on Moscow, which has denied any involvement. Lithuanian officials say such incidents show why the Baltic states need to be ready.
Money has been a sticking point. Poland and the three Baltic states put forward a €382 million joint request to Brussels last year to strengthen vulnerable parts of their networks, and only €112 million was approved. Lithuania has also said it would ask the EU to cover at least half the cost of Gizai.
Why it matters beyond Lithuania
Lithuania sits on NATO’s eastern edge and borders both Russia and Belarus, which makes its choices a test case for the rest of Europe. If a country on the front line can build a grid that continues to function under attack, other member states may take note. Several have been quietly reviewing the vulnerability of substations, interconnectors and undersea cables.
The new plants and autonomous zones will take years to complete. But the direction is clear. In the Baltic region, energy security is being treated as defence policy, and the design of the grid itself is becoming a deterrent.
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